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Overview of the Reform
In a series of steps in the 1990s, Sweden converted a two-tier defined benefit scheme
from 1960 into a combination of notional defined contribution (NDC) pay-as-you-go and
financial defined contribution (FDC) schemes. The reform was driven by the threat of
future large contribution rate increases, redistributional unfairness in the design of the old
system and a goal of providing a framework that would promote mandatory saving
through the pension system – but with privately managed assets.
The overall contribution rate for the two schemes together is 18.5 % of earnings,
with a split of 16/2.5 between the notional and financial account schemes. The annuity in
both schemes is based on lifetime account values and life expectancy at retirement.
Accounts in the NDC system earn an economic rate of return, whereas accounts in the
FDC scheme earn a financial rate.
The reform creates mandatory insurance without redistribution – other than over
the individual’s own lifetime, and the redistribution from men to women embodied in the
unisexual life expectancy factor used to compute annuities, both in the NDC and FDC
schemes. Redistribution is financed through general revenues, instead of through the
insurance system, with the most important example being a new guarantee benefit for
low-income pensioners. Also, all non-contributory credits are financed with general
revenues, and money is transferred to the NDC and FDC schemes to support these credits.
As a part of the reform, a separate deduction for pensioners was abolished putting all
forms of pension income and earnings on the same tax status.
The remainder of this paper focuses on why the reform was undertaken and how
the new system is designed.
The Problems Confronting Reformers
In 1990, a government commission that had been working during the second half of the
1980s concluded that the defined benefit system then in place, which combined a flat rate
benefit (Folkpension) with an earnings-related scheme (Allmänna tilläggspension  -
called ATP) requiring 30 years of coverage for a full benefit and basing the benefit itself
on an average of a participant’s best 15 earnings-years, was financially unstable. With
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long-term rates of real economic growth considerably under 2 % these schemes would
require such high contribution rates that it was unlikely that future workers would be able
to honor “commitments.”
In addition, numerous studies had demonstrated that the 15/30 year rule
transferred money from blue-collar workers and others who worked long careers to
persons with shorter earnings careers and steeper income profiles (Ståhlberg 1990). This
is, in fact, a typical characteristic of schemes that base the computation of benefits on the
best “x”  years of some number of years that is less than lifetime earnings. These schemes
are usually to the disadvantage of persons who start work early and have long working
careers compared to those who enter the labor force much later after a period of higher
education. This was why Swedish reformers focused the new system on lifetime accounts.
Increases in longevity were also putting financial pressure on the system. With
every new projection, demographers were adjusting life expectancy upwards. In fact,
unisexual life expectancy, based on actual outcomes, was increasing at the rate of about
one year for every 10 years that passed. Put in another way, persons born in 1950, who
would become pensioners in 2015, would live 6 years longer than persons who became
65 in 1965, shortly after the system was implemented (1960), and this trend was
projected to continue, and perhaps become even sharper. To offset the effects of
increasing longevity in the old system, the workforce would have to continue to grow and
at a pace sufficient to finance all of these additional years. Sweden has had a birth rate of
around 2 children per woman during most of the past century, which is just short of what
is needed to reproduce the population, but far from enough to support an increase in
longevity.
Since the 1960s, net immigration and the entrance of women into the formal
workforce has accounted for labor force, growth. However, women born in the mid-
1940s and later now work about the same number of years as men, so there can only be
gains from encouraging both men and women to participate longer – or to accept that
pension rights will have to respond to changing life expectancy.
The following table illustrates the problem. In 1960 there were about 3.5 persons
contributing per old-age beneficiary, and about three contributors per old-age and
disability recipient together. By the turn of the century, there were about 2.6 contributors
per old-age beneficiary, but only about 2 workers per old-age and disability recipient
together. By the year 2030, present demographic projections indicate that, with a
retirement age of 65 as now,  the ratio of old-age pensioners to contributors will be
around 1.8, and that the ratio old-age plus disability recipients to contributors will be
around 1.5.
There are two conclusions to draw from this. The first is that the de facto
retirement age must increase, or benefits must be adjusted downwards with increasing
longevity. The new NDC and FDC schemes do just this. The second observation is that
there are too many people on disability, and that the upward trend in disability grants
must be reversed. Older workers who too easily qualify for disability today must be kept
in the workforce longer by offering them suitable work environments, including the
option to work less than full time, and perhaps with more flexible schedules. (This would
probably be welcomed by everyone in the labor force, and especially parents with young
children.) Older workers will probably have to get used to smaller earnings gains, too,
and to maintaining their human capital for much longer periods.3
  
Dependency Rate. Pensioners as a percent of contributors.
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Table 1 illustrates the financial problem resulting from both demographic and
economic developments in the future. With no reform and a long-term real growth rate of
1 %, the contribution rate would have to be around 29 % in 2040, when persons born in
1975 – that is current new entrants into the labor force – would reach the age of 65. With
2 % growth in the contribution base, the picture is better, although there is still a
considerable cost increase.
The reform stabilized the system. Table 1 shows two “options” – one with per
capita wage indexation and one with wage sum indexation in the NDC scheme – and
assuming the whole system is NDC with a contribution rate of 18.5 %. The figures
assume there is no reserve fund, which there in fact is, so that the financial picture is
better in practice. In addition, for purposes of comparability with the old system, the
guarantee benefit, which is financed over the state budget, is included in the new system
calculations.
Year 2000 2020 2040 2060
   1 % growth 16 24.1 28.7 29.8
   2 % growth 16 20.6 22.5 22.9
   1 % growth 16 19.5 19.9 20
   2 % growth 16 18.8 19.4 19.6
   1 % growth 16 19.5 19.3 19.1
   2 % growth 16 18.9 18.8 18.8
Table 1. Contribution rate needed for balance without a fund.
Old system
New system - per capita wage indexation
New system - wage sum wage indexation
Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997
754 969 1382 1554 1592
145 212 303 361 417
2692 3422 4126 4387 4160
0.28 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.38
0.33 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.48 5. Dependency = (1.+2.)./3.
1. Old age benefits
2. Disability benefits
3. Contributors
4. Dependency = 1./3.4
The first option in the table reflects the actual form of indexation chosen, although
the second option would correspond to employing the balance index, which adjusts
balances to the rate of return that the system can afford, and which is discussed at the end
of this paper. The system goes towards its long run equilibrium contribution rate of
18.5 %, and, as time passes, the main difference between the long-run macro level   and
the contribution of 18.5 % paid by participants is the cost of the guarantee – financed
with separate revenues from the state budget.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the reform itself, and discusses some of
the critical choices made by the Swedish politicians in constructing the reform. A
lengthier discussion of the political process can be found in Palmer (2001).
Considerations in the Transition from the Old to the New System
How to make the transition from one to another system is one of the most difficult issues
in reforming pension systems. People have acquired rights under the old system, and
these should be honored. However, as in the old Swedish defined-benefit scheme,  it can
be difficult to give the rights a precise value since the system to be replaced requires
knowledge of the entire working career to determine the outcome for the individual.
In the old Swedish earnings-related defined-benefit scheme, a full benefit was
based on the best 15 of 30 years of coverage. It is usually not possible to identify the best
15 years of an individual’s working career until one has the entire earnings record at hand.
Furthermore, at any point in time, the majority of participants would not already have the
necessary 30 years for a full benefit, and there is no way of knowing in advance whether
they would actually fulfil the 30-year requirement before retiring. Many people are
emigrants or immigrants and would not have been in Sweden all their lives anyway. All
of these considerations together  meant any attempt to calculate acquired rights in the old
system at the time of the conversion to the new scheme would be based on some
imprecise and arbitrary method.
In light of the difficulty of calculating acquired rights in the old system, in the
reform proposal passed by Parliament in 1994, it was decided to create accounts in the
new system based on computerized earnings and contribution records from 1960, i.e. the
period for which records have been kept for the earnings-related ATP scheme introduced
in 1960. The transition would then be matter of deciding which birth cohort would be the
first to be covered in the new system and whether the transition should be gradual for
some birth cohorts, using a weighted average benefits computed according to the old and
new rules, or whether the first birth cohort covered in the new scheme should have its
entire benefit calculated according to the new rules.
At the one extreme, one could argue in favor of implementing the new system
beginning only with new entrants into the labor force at the time of the reform.
3 This
would recognize the “contract “ for workers already covered by the old system. This was
not feasible, however, since one of the two major driving forces behind the reform was to
create a financially stable system. Had the old system been retained, calculations of the
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future wage base and benefit commitments indicated that the ratio of payments to the
wage sum would increase to 27-29 % (see Table 1), with the not so unrealistic long-run
real growth assumption of one per cent.
One of the most important reasons to reform the old system was to achieve long-
run financial stability. Starting the reform with new entrants would thus  have been far
too slow to obtain financial stability. So, it was not realistic to take this path. More
importantly, it would be unlikely that future workers would be willing to support a
system at such a high contribution rate. In other words, it was in any case questionable
whether acquired rights implying such a high future contribution rate would be honored
in the future if the slow transition model were to be adopted.
The reform had to work much faster to achieve the goal of financial stability in
the nearest decades. The transition rule adopted was to base the old-age benefit on a
weighted average of benefits computed according both the rules of the old and the new
system. The reform specified in 1994 had a transition rule for persons born 1935-1953.
As the reform process drew out in time, the first age cohort chosen in the legislation was
the birth cohort of 1938. The cohort born in 1938 would reach the minimum retirement
age of 61 in 1999, and the normal retirement age of 65 in 2003, and by 2003 this age
cohort would be able to have a contribution record covering 43 years from 1960 – from
age 22.
Note that prior to the 1960 reform workers were only covered by a low flat-rate
benefit – the early counterpart of the guarantee in the new system. Consequently people
really had no acquired rights derived from an earnings related scheme prior to 1960. For
this reason, it did not seem unfair to base the new system on earnings starting from 1960.
The final decision was that persons born in 1938 would receive 4/20 of their benefit from
the new system and 16/20 from the old system; persons born in 1939 would have a new-
to- old-system ratio of  5/20 and 15/20 etc. Persons born in 1954 and later are completely
in the new system.
In retrospect, this transition scheme was unnecessarily slow. A complete
transition beginning with a specific birth cohort, or a quicker weighting scheme (for
example 10 years) would have been preferable. With the weighting model chosen, the
small percentages at both ends (proportions of 17/20, 18/20,19/20 in the new system and
3/20, 2/20 and 1/20 in the old system, etc.) do not make a lot of difference for the average
beneficiary. Furthermore, with real per capita wage growth of over 2%, all participants
except those with short earnings careers are better off in the new system. In fact, the old
system was not more generous than the new system under all circumstances, only under
conditions that were very difficult or impossible to support financially – that is real long-
term economic growth under 1.5% .
Finally, the financial account scheme started with contributions paid from 1995.
This means that only new entrants into the labor force from 1995 are completely covered
in the financial account system, although individual fund choices were postponed until
the autumn of the year 2000. Persons born in 1938 have only very small financial account
values since. Firstly, most of their earnings career had passed by 1995, and second, the
transition rule puts them mainly in the old system. The inclusion of older birth cohorts in
the FDC scheme was, thus, mainly symbolic. It would have been logical to start the
financial scheme with a younger age cohort, and perhaps to have made it optional for6
persons who because of their age at the time of introduction of the scheme, would not be
able to accumulate large account values.
 4
Description of the New Pension System
Contributions from earnings
The total contribution rate to the earnings-related NDC and FDC schemes is 18.5 % (on
earnings net of the deduction for contributions). This is split, between 16% for the NDC
and 2.5% for the FDC scheme. Contributions are noted on the notional accounts and
transferred to the financial accounts together with contributions financed from the state
budget for non-contributory rights – for childcare, military conscription and higher
education -  and rights derived during periods covered by other forms of social insurance,
the main examples being parental leave, sickness, unemployment and disability. For the
transition cohorts, the contribution rates of 16 % and 2.5% are weighted by the
percentage of participation of each in the new system in creating accounts.
Contributions are paid on earnings above the minimum level at which income
must be declared for tax purposes (presently about 900 dollars per year) and up to a
ceiling of about 29 000 dollars, using an exchange rate of 10 kronor per dollar.  (The
Swedish krona has fluctuated between 5.5 and 11.0 kronor per dollar since 1995 and is
presently close to its least favorable conversion level.) The ceiling is rather low, which is
connected to the fact that most Swedes also belong to a quasi-mandatory scheme that
supplements the public schemes. From 2002, the ceiling is indexed to the per capita wage,
thereby taking into account both price and real wage growth.
In principle, it would have been logical to simply have a pension contribution rate
levied on individual earnings. The economic logic of this is that in the long run it is the
employees who pay the contribution rate anyway, through foregone present or future
increases in real wages. There is empirical evidence based on large changes in employer
contribution rates in the 1970s that this has also been the case in Sweden.
According to the empirical evidence for Sweden (Palmer and Palme 1989), an
increase in the employer contribution rate is eventually passed on to workers, through a
combination of higher inflation and lower wage increases. It is also well known that in
practice it is difficult to move from employer to employee contributions in a strict
accounting sense, since what actually happens is determined by the response of
employers in a process that also involves wage-negotiation dynamics. A “clean” shift
from employers to workers means that there is no loss or gain for either workers or
employers. In practice workers bear the downside risk of a shift away from employer
contributions to workers. There is no practical method of assuring that all employers fully
compensate their employees for a decrease in the employer contribution rate, although
one might claim that locally in smaller workplaces individual workers may have direct
influence on what happens, and in larger workplaces unions would supervise the
conversion closely.
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Because of the fear that the conversion would not be perfectly executed, the major
unions in Sweden protested, and their voices were heard. The Social Democratic Party,
with strong blue-collar labor support among the electorate, favored employer
contributions from the outset, whereas the governing opposition parties favored a
complete switchover to an employee insurance fee. A compromise was reached at 50-50.
In practice, almost all the conversion to employee contributions was implemented in the
1990s by reshuffling existing employee contributions, introduced largely for other
purposes. As a result, to date there has been no conversion per se, although the exact goal
of a 50-50 split between employee and employer contributions has almost been achieved.
Non-contributory rights and rights for periods of sickness, disability and
unemployment covered by social insurance
Since both the NDC and FDC account systems are based on earnings, one of the more
important aspects of the reform was to work out rules that provided compensation for
time spent out of the labor force in conjunction with child birth. Child rights in the new
system make a significant difference, too. Typically, a woman who is at home with
children will be almost completely compensated in the new pension scheme – that is will
have almost the same account values she would have had if she had full earnings from
work during this period.
5
Briefly, childbirth credits are acquired as follows. Credits are given for a
maximum of four years per child, although only one credit can be earned at any given
time (two children born two years apart give 6 credit years in total). The credit can be
claimed by either parent, but to date is usually claimed by the mother. Claimants are
entitled to the most advantageous of: 1) contributions based on 75 % of average earnings
for all covered persons; 2) contributions based on 80 % of the individual’s own earnings
the year prior to child birth: or 3) a supplement consisting of a fixed amount, indexed
over time to the (covered) per capita wage.
The cost of financing these credits will vary with the number and timing of births.
Calculations performed in conjunction with the reform, based on a future birth rate of
1.8-2.0 children per woman and current patterns of taking leave from the workforce in
conjunction with child birth indicate an average cost comparable to around 0.8 percent of
the wage sum – or comparable to a contribution rate of about this size. Credits were
granted retroactively from 1960. Individual calculations based on a sample of actual
earnings records show that, all other things equal, older birth cohorts fared well in the
new system due to this rule.
6
Military conscription rights are based on the daily remuneration of persons doing
their service, and educational rights are based on the size of public grants available for
higher education. As a matter of principle, one can question the grant of credits for higher
education, since the divided to higher education is supposed to be a higher level of human
capital and, consequently, higher lifetime earnings than would be the case without this
investment. On the other hand, in practice, blue-collar unions supporting traditionally
male unskilled and skilled manual-labor occupations have been more successful than
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unions representing traditional female occupations that require higher formal education
(for example, education, social and health care) in wage negotiations, and there is still
little evidence that this will change. Given this lopsided picture of reality, it was easier to
argue politically in favor of credits for higher education.
Periods of sickness, disability and unemployment covered by social insurance
provide financed rights in both the NDC and FDC schemes. Benefits for sickness and
unemployment are treated as earnings in computing contributions. The sickness and
unemployment schemes pay for the employer share of the contribution for sickness and
unemployment.
The question of how to integrate disability and the old-age scheme is one of the
more difficult issues in creating account schemes. The reason is that most people will
have worked and contributed through earnings from work during most of their lives. In
fact, in Sweden, as in most of the OECD, most new disability grants come after the age of
55. In the Swedish reform model, an imputation of future earnings is made (based on an
average of past years earnings), and  the contributions calculated on the basis of this
imputed income are transferred from the state budget into the NDC and FDC schemes. In
this way people get credited account values just as when they earn income from
employment, the difference being that the government pays the contribution rate through
the disability scheme. This also helps to make transparent all the costs of the growing
number of persons on the disability rolls.
7
A disability benefit is converted into an old-age benefit at age 65 in the Swedish
reform legislation. Since the lowest retirement age in the new system is 61, it is not
obvious that the conversion should be made at age 65. Instead, it could have been made at
the minimum pension age, i.e. 61. However, this would have given a very low benefit,
and the goal of the Swedish reform was to provide adequate benefits. For persons with
long earnings histories, and, in principle, where disability is an event outside the control
of the individual, disability is the system alternative offered prior to the minimum age at
which an old-age benefit can be claimed, whatever this age is.
In Sweden, and in similar settings where life expectancy from age 60 - 65 is high
these days, and where policy makers increasingly want to promote the message that older
healthy older workers can and should work longer, a better solution (in the Swedish
health and life expectancy context) would have been to have set the minimum age for the
old-age benefit higher. For example, if it had been set at age 65, people who could not
work for medical reasons could (as in the present legislation) qualify for a disability
benefit up to the age of 65, where the disability benefit would then be converted into an
old-age benefit at the minimum age for claiming an old-age pension.
Setting a higher age for conversion of disability to old-age benefits, together with
a high minimum age for claiming an old-age benefit  provides a message: Disability is
there for persons who cannot continue to work because of medical reasons. Persons who
want to exit earlier will have to finance early exit with personal savings or through
contributions made earlier to occupational schemes.  Wherever the minimum age is set
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for a claim to an old-age pension in the public scheme, it will nevertheless be important
to consider coupling this age to life expectancy. This helps to keep the benefit higher at
the low end of the scale for persons considering claiming a benefit as soon as they can.
It could be said in retrospect that probably too little attention was devoted to
setting the minimum pension age in the Swedish reform, especially, seen against the
backdrop of steady improvements in the health of persons under 75 and the fact that the
country will to be confronted with a labor shortage from 2010, which cannot be helped by
increasing the participation of women – as in some other OECD countries -  as female
participation has already reached that of men –which has been declining (Palmer 1999b).
Accounts
New accounts were created using information on earnings from existing accounts from
1960 for the NDC scheme and from 1995 for the financial account – FDC -scheme. The
financial account scheme began with contributions being paid into an interim lump-sum
account at the National Debt Office (Treasury) beginning with earnings from 1995.
The technical conversion of old-system accounts from 1960 into NDC accounts
was completed in December 1998. At the same time, individual financial accounts were
created for the contributions that had been paid since 1995. The first individual account
statements were sent out in the spring of 1999, accompanied by an extensive mass media
campaign. Since 1999, account statements are sent out to all participants in the spring of
each year. Owing to a delay in the development of IT support for fund choices and
accounting, the debut for individual fund choices in the financial account scheme was
postponed from the early autumn of 1999 to the autumn of  2000.
Accounts values in the NDC and FDC schemes grow with:
•  New contributions and transfers to the system for non-contributory rights and rights
gained in connection with insurance periods for, for example, sickness,
unemployment and disability.
•  A rate of return based on the growth in the average wage rate in the NDC scheme and
the return on the individual’s fund(s) in the FDC scheme.
•  Inheritance gains. Inheritance gains derive from the accounts of persons who die prior
to the retirement age. They are distributed to the accounts of survivors in the same
birth cohort as the deceased.
All employees and the self-employed are covered in both account schemes from
age 16. This follows a long-standing Swedish tradition of truly universal social insurance
coverage.
Benefits
A full or partial (25%, 50%, 75%) benefit can be claimed from the NDC and/or FDC
scheme separately or together at any age from age 61. There is no upper age limit. A10
benefit can be combined with continued work. Contributions paid on earnings from work
always yield enhanced account values. A person who claims a partial benefit and/or
combines a benefit with work will have the benefit recalculated, based on new account
values, upon permanent retirement.
The annuity is calculated as:
Annuity = Account value / unisexual life expectancy from retirement
and
-  in the NDC scheme assuming a real annual return of 1.6% during retirement
- in the financial account system taking into account the return on the funds of annuity
recipients.
In the financial account system the participant can choose either a fixed or
variable life annuity. The fixed annuity is obtained by transferring the participant’s
financial account to the PPM, the public agency responsible for the financial account
scheme. The PPM then calculates an annuity using traditional actuarial standards. If the
PPM is successful in determining the life expectancy factor and if its investment of
participant assets yields a good return, there could also be a bonus given to participants.
Participant can choose to leave their money in financial market accounts, in which case
the annuity will be based on value the participant’s account balance, and will be
recalculated annually. This is what is called a variable rate annuity. Note also that a joint
life annuity is also offered, although with a reduction factor of 14 % (for actuarial
reasons). Within the FDC scheme, a survivor benefit can also be subscribed to during
working years.
In the NDC scheme the permanent life expectancy factor is determined for a
cohort in the year in which its members turn 65, even for individuals who claim a benefit
before or after this age. The annuity in the NDC system is indexed to the CPI, however a
yearly adjustment (up or down) is made for trend divergence of real per capita
contribution growth from the growth norm of 1.6 % used in calculating the original
annuity value. Even benefits of pensioners born 1937 and earlier are indexed from 2002
with inflation plus the difference between 1.6 % and the actual outcome.
Although early retirement is possible for persons born in 1938 in 2001, most
persons born in 1938 are expected to claim benefits in 2003, which has been a “normal”
retirement age for over two and a half decades, in part owing to contractual arrangements
covering about 90 per cent of employees. In addition, a guarantee supplement cannot be
claimed until the age of 65, which for persons born in 1938 is in the year 2003.11
The following tables provide an illustration of how the system works and the replacement
rates an individual born 1975 with earnings from age 22 can expect based on different
market rates of and present life expectancy estimates for a person in the 1975 cohort. The
tables are from Palmer (2000) and Palmer (2001b). These references also explain the
characteristics and logic of the new system in greater detail.
The older worker who postpones claiming a full benefit after age 61 benefits
through three factors in the DC framework. The first is additional contributions. The
second is wage indexation of accounts in the NDC scheme and market returns on FDC
accounts not converted into benefits. The third is that life expectancy declines with
increasing age. For the older worker, the latter two are generally more important. One of
the advantages that can be claimed for defined contribution notional and financial
account schemes is that workers can combine work (full or part-time) with a partial or
full benefit from either or both of the social insurance schemes.
Most participants (85-90%) in the public scheme are also covered by an
occupational scheme that provides a supplement to the public scheme. The supplement to
a benefit for the individual varies among the major schemes. For example, an
occupational scheme replaces earnings above the ceiling in the white-collar and public
employee schemes, but also provides a supplement for persons below the ceiling, which
is the emphasis within the blue-collar scheme. The occupational schemes for blue-collar
and municipal employees converted to financial defined contribution schemes in
conjunction with the reform of the public system in the 1990s. Table 2 takes this into
account, by attempting to compute the overall replacement rate for a person who, in
addition to the public schemes, has a DC financial supplement in an occupational scheme.12
The outcome for the individual depends, not surprisingly, on the financial rate of
return assumed for the financial account schemes. The table provides examples with rates
of return of 2 %, 5 % and 8 %. A rate of 2 % is close to the real rate of economic growth
in the past four decades, as well as the return on government bonds (which was probably
closer to 3 % as the actual rate was artificially held down during a long period in the
1960s and 1970s). A market rate of return of 5 % represent a portfolio consisting of a 50-
50 average of bonds and equities, and a rate of 8 % depicts an equity portfolio, with an
average historic return for this investment form from the past half century.
 In practice, both economic growth and financial returns have been volatile, and in
any given period of 5-10 years the results can vary greatly, as is familiar. For this reason,
it is advantageous for participants that they do not have to claim their NDC and FDC
annuities at the same time – or in full. Even with a rate of return of “only” 2 %, the
replacement rates are relatively high for career workers entering the workforce in recent
years (and born 1975 in the example), according to Table 2.
The guarantee benefit
  
There is a guarantee benefit for the “lifetime poor, ” available from age 65. The
qualification age of 65 reflects the idea of a “normal” retirement age. This probably could
have been set at an even higher age in Sweden, where life expectancy is high and
increasing due to substantial improvements in health and work industrial environments.13
Persons who cannot work for medical reasons will have disability benefits –
including those born with incapacitating disabilities – so the guarantee will also apply
even to disability recipients when their benefits are converted to old age benefits, also at
age 65. The guarantee benefit is an inflation-indexed supplement (with a specified
maximum) to the total benefit provided by the NDC and FDC earnings-related schemes.
The guarantee is financed with general revenues.
Together with a means-tested housing allowance, it will usually be sufficient to
meet the subsistence norm established by the National Welfare Board. Since it is prorated
with regard to years of residence, with 40 years needed for a full amount, it is possible
that late-working-life immigrants may nevertheless fall under the subsistence norm and
be in need of social assistance, provided by local authorities.
The initial level of the guarantee was set at a high enough gross value to align it
after-tax with the commensurate benefit in the old system. Since the level of the
guarantee is determined by Parliament, whether or not it increases in the future is a social
policy issue. The advantage of separating the guarantee from the NDC and FDC
insurance schemes is that politicians are given free hands to change it when they desire,
without affecting the insurance schemes.
Reserve funds in the NDC scheme
The NDC scheme has a buffer fund that arises due to fluctuations in the sizes of birth
cohorts, but which will also pick up remaining imperfections in the practical design of the
scheme. Reserves, accumulated within the framework of the old system, were
approximately 450 billion kronor at the end of the year 2000. (GDP was around 2100
billion kronor.) These reserves will help in financing the transition period – when the
large cohorts born in the 1940s are only partially within the new system.
The Balance Index - Financial stability and the NDC Scheme
In principle, the  NDC system is financially stable if the figure for life expectancy used in
computing NDC annuities is on average correctly estimated, and if the rate of return in
the account scheme follows the rate of growth of the contribution base. In addition,
reserves in the demographic buffer fund would need to earn a rate of return also
equivalent to the rate of growth of the contribution base.
These conditions are both necessary and sufficient even to provide an annuity that
is indexed to economic growth, i.e. the rate of growth of the contribution base, as long as
the contribution base is not forever decreasing. With a forever declining workforce, there
will be a tendency towards negative imbalance, the extent of which depends on the
strength of the downward trend (Palmer 1999a). With a gradual decline, the problem is
not especially serious, although it must be dealt with.
Of course, the annuity in the NDC scheme does not necessarily have to be
indexed to economic growth, although the argument in favor of doing so is that there will
normally be room to do this and that this is a way to distribute the economic dividend14
(positive or negative) generated over and above productivity growth.  In principle, an
actuary could also calculate the NDC  annuity according to normal actuarial standards.
In the Swedish scheme, the life expectancy factor used in calculating the annuity
is not a forward-looking cohort life expectancy estimate, but an estimate based on the
outcomes of the immediate past for older cohorts. In practice, this generosity comes at the
expense of coming generations, and could be avoided by calculating the annuity factor
with a cohort-based forecast.
8  Swedish politicians have also chosen to index accounts
and annuities with the change in the contribution wage per contributor, i.e. the per capita
wage. The choice was based on the desire to give pension capital and, hence, pensions, a
rate of growth commensurate to average wage growth. If the scheme is only subject to
pure demographic cyclical variation, or a trend increase in the labor force this will never
create  financial stability problem. This does not work financially, however, if the
workforce declines. Put in another way, the scheme can not afford to index with per
capita wage growth if the labor force is diminishing in size, putting a negative drag on
productivity growth (Palmer 1999a).
The final bolt in the Swedish NDC system is the balance index, designed to
compensate for any remaining sources of financial imbalance. The balance index works
as follows (Settergren 2001). An evaluation of the present value of assets and liabilities is
made, based on current information rather than a forward looking projection – the reason
for this is to disjoin the index from political judgments. When the current valuation of
assets falls short of the valuation of liabilities and the index falls under unity, both
account values and benefits are deflated by the difference between the actual index value
and unity. Positive indexation occurs in a recovery until the balance index once again
reaches unity. Simulations performed by the National Social Insurance Board in support
of the legislation of this index show that this method works satisfactorily under a wide
variety of system chocks.
Conclusions
Sweden introduced what this author and others claim is a paradigm change in our way of
viewing pension schemes. This is not the place to discuss all of the ramifications of this
change. The meaning of NDC is discussed and elaborated in Góra and Palmer (2001) and
the important role of the balance index as the final link in the NDC scheme is discussed
in Settergren (2001).
The paradigm change involves separating out social policy from social insurance.
Social insurance is designed as a traditional defined contribution insurance. The NDC
and FDC schemes have a clear advantage over the traditional defined benefit schemes of
social security that tend to mix the goals of redistribution and insurance in the same
benefit package, but sometimes in a way that actually leads to perverse redistribution, as
in the old Swedish system.
Notional accounts (PAYGO) can be combined easily with financial accounts, to
avail the advantages of both. The result of moving in the direction of DC schemes is that
the risks within the system are moved from future workers to present workers while they
are working. In other words, the burden of increasing longevity and perhaps trends
                                                                
8 The Latvian version of the Swedish reform does this, for example.15
towards earlier exit from the workforce is no longer passed forward to coming
generations. The rules governing commitments are clearly specified, and the burden of
acting is placed on workers while they are in the workforce.
Finally, the introduction of NDC and FDC accounts together with equal tax
treatment of earnings and pensions helps reduce the implicit tax force on remaining in the
workforce that characterizes many schemes. Sweden, along with Japan and the US, was
already among the leaders in the OECD in retaining older workers in the workforce (see
Gruber and Wise 1999 and Palme and Svensson 1999), and the new reform moves
Sweden even farther in the direction of removing barriers to increasing the de facto age
of exit from the workforce.16
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